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PROTECTING HATRED PRESERVES FREEDOM:
WHY OFFENSIVE EXPRESSIONS COMMAND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
Andrew P. Napolitano
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment is not the guardian of taste. Instead, the
Constitution of the United States wholeheartedly protects freedom
of thought and expression, even if generated and defined by hatred,
as long as that expression does not produce immediate lawless
violence.1 Although free speech can often lead to tenuous
* Senior Judicial Analyst, Fox News Channel, 1998 to present; Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, 2013 to present; Judge of the
Superior Court of New Jersey, 1987 to 1995; Adjunct Professor of Law, Seton
Hall Law School, 1989 to 2000; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Delaware
(Widener) Law School, 1980 to 1981; A.B., Princeton University, 1972; J.D.,
University of Notre Dame, 1975. The author here records his gratitude to the staff
and editors of the Brooklyn Law School Journal of Law and Policy for their efforts
in putting together this article, and to his Research Fellow, Kimberly Sialiano,
Esq., B.A., Lafayette College, 2009; J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 2014, for her
invaluable contributions during its production.
1 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). In this seminal First
Amendment case, Clarence Brandenburg, a Klu Klux Klan leader, was convicted
under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for his speech at a Klan rally, in
which he exclaimed, “[t]he Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than does
any other organization. We’re not a revengent organization, but if our President,
our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian
race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken.” Id. at 446.
An audience member expressed his bitter hatred for African-Americans and Jews,
stating, “Personally, I believe the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew
returned to Israel.” Id. at 447. In its holding, the Supreme Court struck down the
Ohio statute, which made it a crime to “advocate . . . the duty, necessity, or
propriety” of crime, sabotage, violence, or terrorism as a means of “accomplishing
industrial or political reform” and to “voluntarily assemble” with any society,
group or assemblage of persons “formed ‘to teach or advocate the doctrines of
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relationships and uncomfortable debates, it must be defended
unconditionally, especially when it is purposefully intended to be
hateful or offensive. Too many politicians2 and lawmakers3 believe
that the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment
attaches only to those ideas and expressions they approve of. This is
not so.4 What our Founders intended, and what we so desperately
criminal syndicalism.’” Id. at 448. In unanimously overturning the oppressive
Ohio law, the Supreme Court created a distinct line between an “idea” (advocacy
of violent or unlawful conduct) which is protected, and an “overt act” (intentional,
imminent incitement of such conduct) which is not. Id. at 456. Essentially,
Brandenburg stands for the proposition that all innocuous speech is absolutely
protected; and all speech is innocuous when there is time for more speech to
challenge it.
2 Take for example, President Trump, who as a candidate openly advocated
during his campaign rallies that if elected President he would loosen libel laws, and
place temporary bans on media outlets if they continued to ask questions he didn’t
like. Hadas Gold, Donald Trump: We’re Going to ‘Open Up’ Libel Laws, POLITICO
(Feb. 26, 2016, 2:31 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/02/donald-
trump-libel-laws-219866#ixzz4LNKYJpZm (quoting Donald Trump, “[I]f I win . . .
I’m going to open up our libel laws so when they write purposely negative and
horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money . . . . So when
The New York Times writes a hit piece which is a total disgrace or when The
Washington Post, which is there for other reasons, writes a hit piece, we can sue
them and win money instead of having no chance of winning because they’re totally
protected.”).
3 See Peter Roff, Opinion, The First Amendment is Alive and Well, U.S.
NEWS (Sept. 12, 2016, 3:30 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-
roff/2014/09/12/the-first-amendment-is-alive-and-well-despite-harry-reids-
efforts (explaining former Senator Harry Reid’s (D-NV) attempt in 2014 to amend
the First Amendment by “giving Congress the power to pass laws that determined
what did and what did not constitute heretofore protected political speech,”
thereby giving Congress the power to determine what speech is protected under
the First Amendment based on what it considers acceptable); see also George
Will, Our Rights and His Wrongs, WASH. POST (May 11, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/10/AR2006051001787.html
(discussing how the proposed McCain-Feingold campaign finance law abridges
the freedom of speech by regulating the quantity, content, and timing of political
speech, and the admission of Senator John McCain (R-AZ) that he would “rather
have a clean government than one where . . . First Amendment rights are being
respected”).
4 W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (discussing
in the majority opinion, Justice Robert H. Jackson stated that, “If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
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need now, is a commitment to defend offensive, even hateful
speech—the speech of the deniers, the affronting, and the politically
extreme. It is only in this manner, by having a political system that
allows for completely unencumbered freedom of speech, with no
caveats or qualifications, that we can have open and lively public
debates. Despite Justice Hugo Black’s famous statement—“I read
‘no law abridging’ to mean no law abridging”5—the courts and the
federal government have incorrectly banished much speech to a
place outside the protection of the First Amendment. As a result, the
Supreme Court’s decisions in several free speech cases have created
what professor Laurence Tribe has called a “patchwork quilt of
exceptions.”6
For this reason, I argue below that our Founders intended the
free speech principle to generate a presumption against restricting
any speech, even hateful speech, and that we must harken back to
this norm. Plain and simple, hatred is protected under the
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion”).
5 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring)
(affirming the majority’s holding that an ordinance requiring a book store owner
to be strictly liable for possessing or selling obscene material—meaning the owner
had to know the contents of every book in the store—violated First Amendment
rights). Where the majority “invalidate[d] the ordinance solely because it
penalizes the bookseller for mere possession,” Justice Black advocated for a more
decisive rule which reflected his view that “the First Amendment’s language
leaves no room for inference that abridgements of speech and press can be made
just because they are slight . . . ’no law . . . abridging’ to mean no law abridging.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
6 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 188–92 (1985)
(describing what he says is the Supreme Court’s “inconsistent application
of . . . First Amendment guarantees”); see also Andrew P. Napolitano, Whatever
Happened to Freedom of Speech? A Defense of “State Interest of the Highest
Order” as a Unifying Standard for Erratic First Amendment Jurisprudence, 29
SETON HALL L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1999) (describing the waning commitment by
courts to act as the protectors of the speech liberties guaranteed to individuals and
to the media by the First Amendment). It is of note, however, that in recent years
the Supreme Court has refrained from creating additional categorical exceptions
to the First Amendment. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011) (holding
in light of the “content, form, and context,” the speech of severalWestboro Baptist
Church members picketing near the funeral of military service member involved
matters of public concern and thus, no categorical exception to First Amendment
protection for speech at or near a funeral was carved out).
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Constitution. We all have the right to hate and the right to express
our hatred, offend others, and disagree with our elected officials.7
Without that principle, we are left with the government controlling
our thoughts and punishing the thoughts that it hates and fears.
Ultimately, neither our representatives nor judicial system should
seek to shut down seemingly hateful speech, leaving it
unchallenged.8 Instead, as is underscored in Brandenburg v. Ohio,9
we should be left to refute it with better ideas, thereby enabling all
persons to enjoy an environment that allows for individuals to
discover truth, achieve personal fulfillment, and participate more
meaningfully in our republican form of government.
Part I of this article provides background on the Founders’
recognition that the freedom of speech is a right that all persons
7 It is important here to distinguish between hate speech, and hate crimes.
The former can be loosely defined as speech that is an “‘incitement to
hatred’ . . . primarily against [a person or] group of persons” based on group
affiliation, such as race, gender, religion or ethnic origin. William B. Fisch, Hate
Speech in the Constitution Law of the United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 463
(2002). The difficulty in actually defining this type of speech, however, is
discussed below in Section III.B. On the other hand, hate crimes have been
defined as illegal activities (such as trespassing or assault) that are “motivated by
hatred based on group affiliation.” Richard J. Williams, Jr., Burning Crosses And
Blazing Words: Hate Speech and the Supreme Court’s Free Speech Clause
Jurisprudence, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 609, 652 (1995) (citing Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)). A hate crime statute may “criminalize[]
manifested violence toward a person, persons or property based on bias toward
race, religion, gender or some other group characteristic,” including defacement
or destruction of property, and/or provide penalty enhancements. Id. at 637.
8 “Only in extremely limited circumstances—such as speech that is intended
to incite a riot—can the government legally apply censorship to our speech.”
Michael Schaus, Judge Nap: NAACP’s Call to Prosecute Hate Groups Violates
First Amendment – Hate Speech Is Protected, BIZPACREVIEW (June 23, 2015)
http://www.bizpacreview.com/2015/06/23/judge-nap-hnaacps-call-to-prosecute-
hate-groups-violates-first-amendment-hate-speech-is-protected-216986?.
9 See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (discussing how
the passage of time for speech which challenges the hate speech dissipates the
force of the hatred); see also Steven G. Gey, The Bradenburg Paradigm and Other
First Amendments, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 971, 978 (2010) (explaining that “all
speakers will be immune from legal liability unless the violent or illegal actions
that they advocate occur precisely at the time of the speech. Any lapse in time
between speech and action frees the speaker from the legal consequences of his
or her advocacy”).
PROTECTING HATRED PRESERVES FREEDOM 165
possess by virtue of our humanity, and not merely a right provided
by the U.S. government. Part II defends the absolute right to free
speech based on three different, yet related, philosophical ideals.
Part III argues that the government should not make any effort to
censor “hate speech” because such censorship would vest the
government with the ability to determine what should and should
not be considered “hate speech.” Since the U.S. government did not
create the right to free speech, it cannot take away what it did not
give.
I. “THE” FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE FOUNDING FATHERS EMPHASIS
ON OURNATURAL, PREEXISTING RIGHT OF EXPRESSION
I have consistently argued that the text of the First Amendment
speaks for itself: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech.”10 Such language reveals that the
authors of the Amendment recognized that the freedom of speech
was a preexisting right, and thus comes from some source other than
the Constitution or the government it created. The Amendment
would convey an ambiguous meaning about the preexistence of the
right of free speech were freedom not modified by “the.” This pre-
Constitutional meaning cannot, however, be resolved by reference
to the text alone; instead we must look to historical documents to
help discern how free speech was understood in the early American
republic, and evaluate the theory of natural rights.
The Framers’ reference to the freedom of speech implies that
free speech was not a new concept, but a pre-political right that thus
predated the government. That source of law emanates from human
nature, whether you believe in an all knowing and all loving God or
not. Stated differently, under the Natural Law theory, because all
human beings individually yearn to be free from artificial restraint,
our freedoms, including that of free speech, stem from our very
humanity.11 Since Natural Law posits that our right to freedom of
10 U.S. CONST. amend. I.; see ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, LIES THE
GOVERNMENT TOLD YOU: MYTH, POWER, AND DECEPTION IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 77–78 (2010).
11 ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, CONSTITUTIONAL CHAOS: WHAT HAPPENS
WHEN THE GOVERNMENT BREAKS ITS OWN LAWS xii (2004) [hereinafter
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speech does not come from the government,12 the majority cannot
legislate it away. Instead, individual liberty is defined primarily in
negative terms, as the absence of coercion by the State.13 In other
words, the government is prohibited from interfering with a personal
natural right whose exercise thereof does not require a government
permission slip. Moreover, not only is it implied that Congress may
not interfere with freedom of speech, our independent judiciary has
an affirmative duty to prevent all state actors from interfering with
such freedom.14 Properly understood then, the First Amendment is
not an affirmative grant of individual rights, but a restriction on
government that prevents it from infringing on the rights all persons
already have.15
NAPOLITANO, CONSTITUTIONAL CHAOS] (referring to the Natural Law Theory in
support to this assertion). See generally THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARYVIEW
OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA (1774), https://www.wdl.org/en/item/117/
(describing Americans as “a free people claiming their rights, as derived from the
laws of nature, and not as the gift of their chief magistrate”); JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, BOOK 2, Ch. 4 §22 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988)
(asserting that it “the natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power
on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have
only the law of nature for his rule”). Most scholars today believe that Jefferson’s
views on natural law were animated in some measure by Locke. The Declaration
of Independence and Natural Rights: Thomas Jefferson, Drawing on the Current
Thinking of His Time, Used Natural Rights Ideas to Justify Declaring Independence
from England, CONST. RTS. FOUND., http://www.crf-usa.org/foundations-of-our-
constitution/natural-rights.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
12 Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American
Constitutions, 102 YALEL.J. 907, 919 (1993) (explaining how Americans—at the
time the Constitution was ratified—characterized freedom of speech as a natural
right).
13 Eric Mack, Individual Rights, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIBERTARIANISM
244, 246 (Ronald Hamowy et al. eds., 2008).
14 NAPOLITANO, CONSTITUTIONAL CHAOS, supra note 11, at xiii (“Thus,
under the Natural Law, if the Congress, for example, made it unlawful to speak
out against abortion, . . . judges can invalidate those acts, even if there were no
First Amendment protecting freedom of speech and religion.”). “Because the right
to speak and worship as we wish comes from our humanity, not from the
government or from the First Amendment, under Natural Law, judges can enforce
those rights, notwithstanding the legislature or the executive.” Id.
15 Andrew P. Napolitano, Free Speech and Political Conventions, LEW
ROCKWELL (July 28, 2016), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2016/07/andrew-p-
napolitano/secret-service-hates-free-speech/ [hereinafter Napolitano, Free Speech
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The First Amendment was ratified in 1791 after months of
debate and discussion by the Congressional Committee organized to
develop a Bill of Rights. Within the First Congress, it was James
Madison who took up the charge of enumerating a nonexhaustive
Bill of Rights.16 As a result, Madison’s stated intentions are perhaps
the most relevant in interpreting the Framers’ and Ratifiers’
understanding of natural law and free speech, particularly regarding
how people retain the natural rights they do not surrender.
Madison, in his speech to the House introducing the Bill of
Rights, believed that such a list would serve a merely “declaratory”
purpose, that “evince[s] that spirit of deference and concession”
innate to republican government.17 The entire declaratory end of this
was to “insert [such a list] merely for greater caution.”18 Madison
argued that some specific list of natural rights was necessary to calm
anxieties, despite the widespread Federalist assertion that such a list
was unnecessary,19 as all rights not surrendered are retained and any
power which allows government action to infringe on the rightful
free action of individuals is contrary to nature.20 Elsewhere in
and Political Conventions] (“Though the First Amendment was originally written
only to restrain Congress . . . it is now uniformly interpreted to restrict all
government in America from abridging the freedom of speech.”).
16 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 441, 448–49 (J. Gales & W. Seaton eds., 1789)
(statement of Rep. James Madison). See generally ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO,
FREEDOM ANSWER BOOK: HOW THE GOVERNMENT IS TAKING AWAY YOUR
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS 99 (2012) (explaining that when debating whether
or not to include an enumeration of rights in the Constitution, the Founders agreed
free speech was a natural right, but disagreed on the need to recognize the right in
the Constitution if there was no “explicit grant of power to curtail” that right).
17 1 ANNALSOFCONG. 449, 457 (J. Gales &W. Seaton eds., 1789) (statement
of Rep. James Madison).
18 Id. at 452 (statement of Rep. James Madison).
19 See id. at 455 (statement of Rep. James Madison) (“It has been said by
way of objection to a bill of rights . . . that they are unnecessary articles of a
republican government, upon the presumption that the people have those rights in
their own hands, and that is the proper place for them to rest.”).
20 See id. at 441 (expressing concern that if Congress continued to ignore the
citizens’ calls for a bill of rights, Americans “may think we are not sincere in our
desire to incorporate such amendments in the constitution as will secure those
rights, which they consider as not sufficiently guarded. The applications for
amendments come from a very respectable number of our constituents, and it is
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Madison’s writings, he unequivocally expressed his belief that the
First Amendment reflects a natural right of the individual.21 In
particular, when debating the Sedition Act of 179822 in the House of
certainly proper for congress to consider the subject, in order to quiet that anxiety
which prevails in the public mind”).
21 For example, “JamesMadison was a member of the committee that drafted
the Virginia proposals” for amendments to the Constitution, and he himself “noted
the role [these] proposals played in his proposed draft of the Bill of Rights.”KURT
T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT n.31 (2009) (quoting
Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Nov. 20, 1789), in 2THEBILL
OFRIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARYHISTORY 1185 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971)). The
Virginia proposals read as follows: “First, [t]hat there are certain natural rights of
which men, when they form a social compact cannot deprive or divest their
posterity, among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.” Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June
27, 1788), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES,
SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 636 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). Madison considered
one’s opinions and beliefs to be a component of property, and further espoused
that our government was formed in order to guard such interest from
infringement of any kind. JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY, 266–68 (Mar. 29, 1792),
http://press pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s23.html (explaining
that property means “‘that dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual’ . . . . [A] man
has a property in his opinions and the free communication of them . . . .
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies
in the various rights of individuals . . . . This being the end of government, that
alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is
his own” (emphasis in original)).
22 In 1798, under the direction of President John Adams, the federal
government enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts, one of which made it a federal
crime to publish any false, scandalous or malicious writing—even if true—about
the president or the federal government, notwithstanding the guarantee of free
speech in the First Amendment. Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). The
government used this law to torment its political adversaries in the press. See
CHARLES SLACK, LIBERTY’S FIRST CRISIS: ADAMS, JEFFERSON AND THEMISFITS
WHO SAVED FREE SPEECH 114, 127–28 (2015) (discussing the case of Matthew
Lyons, a Vermont congressman who criticized President John Adams for his
“unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish avarice,” and
as a result, was convicted of libel and sentenced to four months in jail. (citing
FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
ADMINISTRATION OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 333 (1849))). Then-Vice
President Thomas Jefferson vowed that if he ever became president, these
abominable laws would be abolished. Id. at 163–64 (“I should be for resolving the
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Representatives, Madison exclaimed “[i]f we advert to the nature of
republican government, we shall find that the censorial power is in
the people over the government, and not in the government over the
people.”23 Thus, as we learn from Madison, the reason this freedom
is referred to as the freedom of speech is to reflect the Framers’
belief that the right to speak freely is a pre-political, integral aspect
of our humanity—not one granted by the government.24 The word
“the” reflects the unmistakable revelation that the personal freedom
of speech already existed at the time the First Amendment itself was
drafted, debated, and ratified.
II. A PHILOSOPHICALDEFENSE OF FREE SPEECH
The Framers’ recognition of the freedom of speech as a right
inherent in all persons is rooted in several tenets of classical liberal
philosophy. This section presents the key features of that philosophy
in support of the pre-political nature of free speech described in the
previous section.
A. Freedom of Speech Realizes Our Personal Natural
Inclination for Self-Fulfillment and Individual
Autonomy
The First Amendment as imagined by the Framers tolerates the
maximum possible public discourse and disagreement; and it
commands the government to protect this value from governmental
alien and sedition laws to be against the constitution and merely void . . . . [O]ur
general government has, in the rapid course of [nine] or [ten] years, become more
arbitrary and has swallowed more of the public liberty than even that of England.”
(citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, (Nov. 26, 1798), in 2 THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 21)). Jefferson did
become President, and the Acts did expire, but this became “a lesson for future
generations: [t]he guarantees of personal freedom in the Constitution are only as
valuable and reliable as is the fidelity to the Constitution of those to whom we
have entrusted it for safekeeping.” Andrew P. Napolitano, No More Asking for
Permission to Speak, LEW ROCKWELL (Mar. 21, 2013),
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/03/andrew-p-napolitano/the-government-
doesnt-give-us-free-speech/.
23 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of Rep. James Madison).
24 Napolitano, Free Speech and Political Conventions, supra note 15.
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interference for several reasons. First, the freedom of speech is at
the core of our individuality. As Justice Thurgood Marshall once
said, “[t]he First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity
but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-
expression . . . . To suppress expression is to reject the basic human
desire for recognition and affront the individual’s worth and
dignity.”25 Ron Paul has eloquently elaborated on this point: “We
don’t have the First Amendment to talk about the weather. We have
the First Amendment so we can say very controversial things”26
without fear of being harassed, sued, arrested, or jailed. Once the
government begins to ban certain speech, however repugnant it is,
individual thinking is paralyzed, and ultimately, persons may censor
themselves out of fear of persecution. Moreover, government
legislation that defines what is appropriate versus incendiary speech
insinuates that people cannot think for themselves and prevents the
very important process of self-development.
The beauty of the First Amendment is not only that it protects
the right of all who speak to be heard, but also the right of everyone
in the audience to listen and be exposed to various expressions. Two
historical giants, John Milton and Thomas Paine, influenced the
drafters of the First Amendment and supported this idea.27 In 1644,
the English poet John Milton published Areopagitica (referencing
“Areopagus,” the highest judicial court of Athens known for orderly
discussion and free expression) as an appeal to Parliament to rescind
the censor-imposing Licensing Order of June 16th, 1643.28 Milton,
25 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974).
26 Ron Paul in 2011 GOP Primary Debate in South Carolina, ON THE ISSUES
(May 5, 2011), http://www.ontheissues.org/Archive/2011_SC_Ron_Paul.htm.
27 See David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First
Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 875–78 (1986) (tracing the First
Amendment doctrine’s “philosophical origins” to John Milton, John Locke, John
Stuart Mill, and others) (“As Justice Holmes remarked . . . . ‘[T]he provisions of
the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form;
they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil.’” (quoting
Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914))).
28 John Milton, Areopagitica; A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of
Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of England, DARTMOUTH: JOHN MILTON
READINGROOM (1644), http://www.dartmouth.edu/~milton/reading_room/areopagitica/text.html.
The Order was designed to bring publishing under government control by creating
official censors to whom authors would submit their work for approval prior to
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who vigorously opposed the licensing, argued that pre-censorship of
authors was an excuse for state control of thought. He wrote a
powerful argument that rings true today—that the endeavor of
seeking to know the truth must be prioritized above all else: “Aman
may be a heretic in the truth, and if he believe[s] things only because
his pastor says so, or the assembly so determines, without knowing
other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds
becomes his heresy.”29
Similarly, in 1794, in the introduction to his masterpiece, The
Age of Reason, Thomas Paine addressed his fellow citizens of the
United States: “I have always strenuously supported the right of
every man to his own opinion, however different that opinion might
be to mine. He who denies to another this right, makes a slave of
himself to his present opinion, because he precludes himself the
right of changing it.”30 Paine’s use of the word “slave” is telling.
When certain speech is censored, society is at the mercy of what the
censurers deem appropriate speech. Put another way, society
becomes enslaved to the censor’s beliefs.31
having it published. Effectively, however, the Order resulted in many search and
seizures of books, book burnings, and even arrests. Licensing Order of June 14,
1643, reprinted in 2 JOHN MILTON, COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON
797 (1959).
29 Milton, supra note 28.
30 THOMAS PAINE, THEAGE OFREASON: BEING AN INVESTIGATION OF TRUE
AND FABULOUS THEOLOGY 3 (1852).
31 Contemporary jurisprudence echoes this concern. For example, the
Supreme Court has guarded the privacy of membership lists of groups engaged in
the free trade in ideas and beliefs, especially “where the challenged privacy is that
of persons espousing beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors and the
deterrent and ‘chilling’ effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined
rights of free speech, expression, and association is . . . more immediate and
substantial.” Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556–
57 (1963); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (invalidating
a New Hampshire law mandating the display of the state motto on automobile
license plates and thereby affirming the First Amendment “right of individuals to
hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way
New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable”).
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B. Unregulated Speech Creates a “Marketplace of Ideas”
and Promotes the Search for Truth
Second, the freedom of speech is necessary to foster a
“marketplace of ideas,” a concept advanced by John Stuart Mill in
his work, On Liberty, and ingrained in free speech discourse.32
According to Mill, truth is identified when ideas are exchanged,
debated, and cultivated over the course of time.33Mill also argued
that persons and governments must allow unfettered free
speech regardless of the consequences in order to reap societal
benefits of cultural progress, peace, and feelings of mutual
respect.34 It is only through this process of allowing individuals to
voice diverse, controversial, and even incendiary opinions that
persons may air their grievances, resulting in free and open
discourse that works as a pressure release valve for their
trepidations. Silencing controversial ideas damages all participants:
the dissenter, the censor, and, ultimately, society at large.35 Mill
argued:
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and
only one person were of the contrary opinion,
mankind would be no more justified in silencing that
one person, than he, if he had the power, would be
justified in silencing mankind . . . . The peculiar evil
of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the
existing generation; those who dissent from the
opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the
32 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Boston: Ticknor and
Fields, 2d ed. 1863) (advocating for an absolutist approach to free speech and
complete protection of political speech).
33 Id. at 100–01 (“Not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the
quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil: there is always hope when
people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that
errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by
being exaggerated into falsehood.”).
34 See id.
35 See id. at 101–02 (“[I]f any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion
may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own
infallibility.”).
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opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity
of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose,
what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced
by its collision with error.36
Professor Franklyn S. Haiman of Northwestern University
elaborated on Mill’s thesis, pointing out that “[p]lacing limits on the
verbal expression of group hatreds does not make the underlying
attitudes go away. Instead they go underground to fester and perhaps
erupt in a more violent form later.”37
Mill’s argument that freedom of expression is guaranteed
because of the need to test the truth of ideas in competition with
others is perhaps best embodied in one of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s most famous dissents. In Abrams v. U.S.38 he wrote that,
“we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference
36 Id. at 35.
37 Franklyn S. Haiman, Why Hate Speech Must be Heard, CHI. TRIB. (Oct.
30, 1991), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-10-30/news/9104070589_1_racist-
leaflets-speech-supreme-court. Professor Haiman further argues, “[T]here is a
crucial difference between verbal communication and physical blows. A physical
blow will hurt no matter what goes on in the victim’s mind, but a verbal attack
will hurt only if it is mentally understood. It is not the words themselves that hurt
but the meaning they convey.” Id.
38 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). In Abrams, the defendants, five self-proclaimed un-naturalized
Russian anarchists, wrote and distributed materials opposing the United States
form of government and the deployment of troops into Russia during World War
I, and were indicted on four counts of conspiring to violate the Espionage Act of
1917. Id. at 616–18. The majority, affirming the convictions, stated:
[W]hile the immediate occasion for this particular outbreak of
lawlessness, on the part of the defendant alien anarchists, may
have been resentment caused by our Government . . . the plain
purpose of their propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis
of the war, disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped,
revolution, in this country for the purpose of embarrassing and
if possible defeating the military plans of the government in
Europe.
Id. at 623.
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with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
check is required to save the country.”39
The First Amendment protects loathsome opinions and those
who utter them from suppression by majoritarian forces; after all,
popular speech is unlikely to face government oppression. An
enlightened and tolerant society does not censor speech; instead, it
allows all persons to express their biases and hatreds. New York
Law School Professor Nadine Strossen, relying to some degree on
Mill’s connection between speech and the search for truth, has
argued persuasively that restricting hate speech will only mask
hatred, not dissipate it.40 Indeed, “[c]ensoring hate speech merely
pushes hate underground, where it lurks beneath the guise of
civility: invisible but not obliterated . . . impossible to target, and
thus impossible to dismantle.”41 The censoring of hate is far worse
than the expression of hate because it “prevents people from judging
and evaluating for themselves how to respond to the views—
however prejudiced—of their fellow citizens.”42
39 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Holmes
explained:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe . . . that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution.
Id.; see also H.L. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: FREE SPEECH
AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 10 (1991) (discussing how Justice Holmes was
influenced by the philosophy of John Stuart Mill).
40 See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 494 (1990) (“[E]quality will be served most
effectively by continuing to apply traditional, speech-protective precepts to racist
speech, because a robust freedom of speech ultimately is necessary to combat
racial discrimination.”).
41 Jonathan Haidt & Peter Tatchell, Hate Speech is Free Speech, SPIKED
ONLINE (June 12, 2016), http://www.spiked-online.com/freespeechnow/fsn_article/hate-
speech-is-free-speech#.V6TA8UvwwRY (quoting SarahHaider).
42 Id. (quoting Frank Furedi).
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C. Unfettered Political Speech Allows for Democratic Self-
Governance and Helps Prevent Tyranny of the Majority
A third general need for unrestricted freedom of speech is that
an informed electorate must be free to challenge the government and
demand its transparency and accountability. Freedom of speech,
particularly political speech, is therefore necessary because voters
must have access to information, including full and robust debate
about their elected officials, in order to make well-informed
decisions. Free expression has value because of the function it
performs in checking the abuse of official power and ensuring our
participation in government.43
As part of the break with the British system, our Founders sought
to preserve the “inalienable” right to govern ourselves.44 George
Washington cautioned, “If freedom of speech is taken away, then
dumb and silent we may be led, like sheep to the slaughter.”45 In
turn, we as a people consented to be governed, conditioned upon the
right to participate via a vote and an absolute right of free speech in
all matters concerning the present or proposed policies of
government.
Moreover, our country was founded upon words of dissent and
open criticism of an unjust government. Those words, used almost
43 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP.
CT. REV. 245, 255–57 (arguing that the First Amendment “protects the freedom
of those activities of thought and communication by which we ‘govern’”).
Perhaps the ultimate authority regarding this justification is Professor Alexander
Meiklejohn, who aptly argued that the Bill of Rights is an integral part of self-
government and thus the First Amendment is meaningless unless considered in
relation to popular government. SeeALEXANDERMEIKLEJOHN, FREESPEECHAND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26–27 (1948) (“The principle of the
freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-
government . . . . It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public
issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.”).
44 Thomas Jefferson, Rough Draft of the Declaration of Independence, in 1
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1760-1776, at 423, 423–28 (Julian P. Boyd
ed., 1950), https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/jefferson’s-
”original-rough-draught”-declaration-independence-0.
45 Letter From George Washington to Officers of the Army (Mar. 15 1783),
reprinted in THEPAPERS OFGEORGEWASHINGTON (WilliamM. Ferraro et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2023), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-
10840.
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as second nature by our Framers in the wake of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, constitute language that would startle today.
For example, when commenting on Shays’ Rebellion, an armed
uprising of farmers in Massachusetts that had been put down by
organized state militia, Thomas Jefferson famously exclaimed:
What country before ever existed a century [and a]
half without a rebellion? [And] what country can
preserve its [sic] liberties if their rulers are not
warned from time to time that their people preserve
the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. The
remedy is to set them right as to facts, pardon and
pacify them. What signify a few lives lost in a
century or two? The tree of liberty must be refreshed
from time to time with the blood of patriots [and]
tyrants. It is its natural manure.46
Jefferson’s argument is much the same as John Stuart Mill’s in On
Liberty; namely, that persons should not be silenced by the
government.
Despite the clear protections found in the First Amendment, the
freedoms protected therein are under constant assault today, whether
it be protesters arrested and forced into “free speech zones”47 or
government whistleblowers forced to seek asylum for exposing
46 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith (Feb. 2, 1788),
in 5 THEWORKSOFTHOMAS JEFFERSON (CORRESPONDENCE 1786-1789) 384, 362
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905), http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/802/86685; see also
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Feb. 22. 1787), in 11THEPAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 174–75 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955),
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-11-02-0182 (“The spirit of
resistance to government is so valuable on certain occasions, that I wish it to be
always kept alive. It will often be exercised when wrong, but better so than not to
be exercised at all.”).
47 The concept of free speech zones “originat[ed] on college and university
campuses in response to the student activism of the 1960s,” but more recently,
free speech zones have been imposed to contain public expression of opinion,
where protests or political activity are confined to designated areas. Joseph D.
Herrold, Capturing the Dialogue: Free Speech Zones and the “Caging” of First
Amendment Rights, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 949, 949–50 (2006). For example, Texas
Tech University, a public university, “designated a twenty-foot-wide gazebo
capable of holding no more than forty people as the sole free speech zone on
campus.” Id. at 951 (citing Betsy Blaney, Lawsuit Claims Tech Curbing Free
Speech, HOUSTON CHRON., June 13, 2003, at 37).
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extraordinary violations of our constitutionally protected privacy
rights.48 As Lenny Bruce famously said, take away the right to say
“fuck” and you take away the right to say “fuck the government.”49
III. PROBLEMS WITHREGULATING “HATE SPEECH”: WHY THE FIRST
AMENDMENTUPHOLDS THE PRESUMPTIONAGAINST
RESTRICTINGHATE SPEECH
A. The Slippery Slope: An Imprecise, Elastic Concept of
“Hate Speech”
Even if we were to allow ourselves to be censored by the federal
government where matters of offense or hatred are concerned, it is
unclear whose standards we would look to when identifying or
distinguishing “hate speech.” Virtually any belief opposed by any
group or faction can be deemed “hatred” and that belief openly
touted, labeled “hate speech.” Thus, distinguishing hate speech from
the broader category of free speech is an endeavor that introduces
48 For example, in 2010, Thomas Drake, a senior executive with the National
Security Agency, was indicted under the Espionage Act for leaking classified
information, after speaking out on “secret mass surveillance programs,
multibillion-dollar fraud and intelligence failures from 9/11.” Timothy Bella,
NSA Whistleblower Thomas Drake: ‘I’ve Had to Create a Whole New Life’,
ALJAZEERA AM. (Nov. 12, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-
tonight/articles/2015/11/12/nsa-whistleblower-thomas-drake-protections-espionage.htm.
Most recently, Edward Snowden exposed to the world a secret order of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which required Verizon, “on an
ongoing daily basis,” to provide the NSA information with all “communications
(i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States,
including local telephone calls.” AmyDavidson, The N.S.A.-Verizon Scandal, NEW
YORKER (June 6, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/the-n-s-
a-verizon-scandal; see also Andrew P. Napolitano, Opinion, A Government of
Secrecy and Fear—Why Edward Snowden Deserves the Thanks of Every
Freedom-Loving American, FOX NEWS (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/10/24/government-secrecy-and-fear-
why-edward-snowden-deserves-thanks-every-freedom.html (arguing that if the
government violated the Constitution via the National Security Agency’s spying
operations, and Edward Snowden knew about this, he had a moral and
Constitutional obligation to reveal such and should be lauded for doing so, not
exiled).
49 FUCK: A DOCUMENTARY (Rainstorm Entertainment 2005).
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too many subjective judgments, ever-changing based on factors
such as who the speaker is or what part of the country you are in.50
One person’s hate speech is often another person’s music, however
fiercely expressed. And therein lies the problem: if persons do not
know how hate speech is defined, how can we anticipate how the
law will be enforced?
The theory of anti-hate speech laws is that hate speech often
leads to violence, violence demands police and consequently, the
expenditure of public resources, and as a result, the government can
make it illegal to spout hatred in order to conserve its resources.51
50 For example, it is common experience in 2017 that some African
Americans may use the n-word differently, at times as a term of endearment, as
compared to ill-intentioned white supremacists. See Amy Adler, What’s Left?:
Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic Expression, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1499, 1520–21 (1996) (“Although the term ‘nigger’ has long been an
element of black vernacular, the word has recently emerged into the mainstream,
primarily through rap music, and has come to be viewed by some as a term of
empowerment when used by blacks.”). While the latter speaker may lack civility
when they use this word, they do not lack the right to say it. The government
cannot grant more protection to the victims of one word over victims of other
seemingly hateful words.
51 In Terminiello v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court held that it would
violate the First and Fourteenth amendments to criminally charge a speaker for
breach of the peace, even where the clash between supporters and protestors
resulted in “several disturbances” and an “angry and turbulent” crowd.
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1949) (“[A] function of free
speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”). In the dissent,
however, Justice Jackson countered and echoed the argument that many
proponents of hate speech regulation espouse, that free speech “depends on local
police, maintained by law-abiding taxpayers . . . . Can society be expected to keep
these men at [a speaker’s] service if it has nothing to say of his behavior which
may force them into dangerous action?” Id. at 31–32, 37 (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(arguing further that “[t]he Court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine that
civil liberty means the removal of all restraints from these crowds and that all
local attempts to maintain order are impairments of the liberty of the citizen. The
choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and
anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its
doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional
Bill of Rights into a suicide pact”); see also ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, SUICIDE
PACT: THE RADICAL EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND THE LETHAL
THREAT TO AMERICAN LIBERTY, at xxix–xxxii (2014) [hereinafter NAPOLITANO,
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This attitude incorrectly presumes, as President Woodrow Wilson
did when he prosecuted individuals for publicly singing German
beer hall songs during World War I,52 that the government is the
origin of free speech and can lawfully limit the speech it has
authorized to that which it does not hate or fear.53 But the
Constitution does not grant the government the power to restrict an
individual’s speech based on moral or value judgments. As argued
above, the right to speak is a natural, personal right. From that it
follows that the right cannot be transferable to an artificial institution
like the government, nor can it be judged according to community
standards.54 The whole purpose of the First Amendment is to assure
that the individuals—and not the government—choose what they
think, say, publish, hear, or observe. The government may not define
speech, chill speech, or deter persons from the free exercise
SUICIDE PACT] (criticizing Justice Jackson’s dissent, which rejects the Natural
Law and reasoned that the unprosecuted exercise of the “hecklers’ veto”—”when
an aroused audience succeeds in silencing a speaker . . . by . . . demanding his
arrest” or drowning out his speech—does not violate the First Amendment).
52 During World War I, under President Wilson, the government enacted
the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918, imposing restrictions
on German-born Americans with the stated goal of eliminating disloyal
statements during wartime. Espionage Act, ch. 30, tit. I, 40 Stat. 217 (1917)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1976)); see alsoPeople andEvents: Prelude
to the Red Scare: The Espionage and Sedition Acts, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/goldman/peopleevents/e_redscare.html (last visited
Jan. 14, 2017) (giving historical background on Espionage and Sedition Acts). As
a result, “the U.S. government maintained a list of German-born aliens
or citizens, and imprisoned more than 6,000 of these immigrants from 1917–
1918 for allegedly assisting Germany’s war effort.” The Anti-German
Crusade, BOUNDLESS U.S. HISTORY, https://www.boundless.com/u-s-
history/textbooks/boundless-u-s-history-textbook/world-war-i-1914-1919-
23/the-war-at-home-180/the-anti-german-crusade-988-8773/ (last visited Jan. 14,
2017); see also NAPOLITANO, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 51, at 71–79 (discussing
President Wilson’s suppression of unpopular viewpoints during World War I by,
among other things, unconstitutionally “flooding the marketplace of ideas . . . with
known falsehoods to whip the country into a belligerent, anti-German frenzy”).
53 Andrew P. Napolitano, What Freedom of Speech?, LEW ROCKWELL (Jan.
15, 2015), http://www.lewrockwell.com/2015/01/andrew-p-napolitano/what-
freedom-of-speech/. “It also presumes that all ideas are equal, and none [are]
worthy of hatred.” Id.
54 See supra Part I.
180 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
thereof.55 The government can speak only when it is necessary for
governance (e.g., the library is closed, the speed limit is sixty-five
miles per hour, the line forms here). To say that the government has
the freedom of speech to express an opinion, or determine what is
“hatred,” is very dangerous. The government has limitless
resources, which can be abused for political ends to drown out
speech it hates and fears. If the government can express opinions on
matters of public interest, it will dominate the debate. Yet very few
can take the government on.
B. Even if “Hate Speech” is Identified, Its Proscription
Amounts to Creating Orwellian “Thought Crimes”
Hate speech is an Orwellian concept used to describe unpopular
beliefs or opinions that are improperly inferred to fall outside the
protections afforded by the First Amendment.56 In the most general
55 It is important to note that the Supreme Court has held that the
Government’s own speech is not protected by the First Amendment’s right to free
speech. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2239, 2253 (2015) (holding that the decision of the Texas Department of Motor
Vehicles Board to reject the respondents’ proposed license plate design featuring
a confederate flag was not impermissible discrimination on the basis of viewpoint
in violation of the First Amendment). Writing for the majority in Walker v. Sons
of Confederate Veterans, Justice Breyer noted that “[w]hen government speaks,
it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what
it says.” Id. at 2245 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–
68 (2009)). Moreover, “[b]ecause the State is speaking on its own behalf, the First
Amendment strictures that attend the various types of government-established
forums do not apply.” Id. at 2250. In his dissent, Justice Alito argued that the
majority had incorrectly expanded the government speech doctrine to include not
only speech by the government, but also government “blessing” of private speech.
Id. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting).
56 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (New American Library,
1950). In George Orwell’s novel, 1984, the government attempts to control not
only the speech and actions but also the thoughts of its subjects, labeling
disapproved thoughts with the term “thought crime.” Id. at 19. The Thought Police
use psychology and ever-present surveillance to find and control, or eliminate
members of society who are capable of the mere thought of challenging the ruling
authority. Orwell described the new totalitarians as follows: “The party is not
interested in any overt act: the thought is all we care about. We do not merely
destroy our enemies; we change them.” Id. at 253. “We are not content with
negative obedience, nor even with the most abject submission. When finally you
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sense, hate speech is prejudice directed at individuals or groups on
the basis of their identity—be it racial, cultural, political, or lifestyle
orientations. However, since at some level all humans are biased,
the focus on bias in hate speech codes is problematic because it leads
to discrimination between “prohibited bias” and “sanctioned bias;”
effectively between unacceptable and acceptable hate.57 Anti-hate
speech legislation means that politics will determine whether speech
is a reflection of closely held ideals, a painful reaction to years of
subjugation, or a salacious joke.58 Therefore, hate speech laws
surrender to us, it must be of your own free will . . . . It is intolerable to us that an
erroneous thought should exist anywhere in the world.” Id. at 255.
57 Haidt & Tatchell, supra note 41. In particular, the Supreme Court has
observed that the very purpose of speech protection is to shield “those choices of
content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.” Snyder v. Phelps,
562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995)) (permitting picketing on public land
outside of a military serviceman’s funeral with signs reading, “Thank God for
Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” and “God Hates Fags,” because they regarded
matters of public concern). Moreover, “[u]nder the First Amendment there is no
such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition
of other ideas.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40, 352 (1974)
(restricting a state’s ability to presume harm in defamation cases); see, e.g., JAMES
B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND IDENTITY
POLITICS 21 (Michael Tony & Norval Morris eds., 1998) (arguing that “creating
a hate crime jurisprudence forces us to proclaim which prejudices are worse than
others, itself an exercise in prejudice”).
58 In our “politically correct” world, it is often acceptable to ridicule or even
silence closely-held religious beliefs, but not those who feel disenfranchised by
such views. For example, when a Christian baker refused to make a cake for a
same-sex couple in Oregon, the bakers were ordered to pay $135,000 in emotional
damages to the complainant, and the state prevented the bakers from speaking
about such refusal by slapping them with a cease and desist order. David French,
Oregon Slaps Christian Bakers with a Fine and Gag Order for Refusing to Help
Celebrate Gay Wedding, NAT’L REV. (July 3, 2015, 6:26 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/420744/oregon-slaps-christian-bakers-
fine-and-gag-order-refusing-help-celebrate-gay-wedding. The Christian bakers’
speech was deemed unacceptable under public opinion, and so was held to be
legally impermissible. See id. However, those who voiced their beliefs—namely,
their criticism of the bakers’ beliefs—were allowed to do so freely, seemingly
because it reflected the more popular view. See id. George Orwell also warned
against this fickle distinction between so-called acceptable and unacceptable hate:
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criminalizing the vocalization of a criminal intent without a real act
are unconstitutional because they would require the criminalization
of an additional element—a government-proscribed thought—most
commonly, racial, religious, political, or sexual-orientation based
hatred not traditionally deemed criminal.59 Who would want to live
here if the government could punish thought?
These “thought crimes” were prevalent in the debate centered
around the proposed Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 2009 (HR 1913). Representative Steve King (R-
IA) noted that the broad definitions in the so-called hate crimes
The point is that the relative freedom which we enjoy depends
on public opinion. The law is no protection. Governments make
laws, but whether they are carried out, and how the police
behave, depends on the general temper in the country. If large
numbers of people are interested in freedom of speech, there
will be freedom of speech, even if the law forbids it; if public
opinion is sluggish, inconvenient minorities will be persecuted,
even if laws exist to protect them . . . The notion that certain
opinions cannot safely be allowed a hearing is growing. It is
given currency by intellectuals who confuse the issue by not
distinguishing between democratic opposition and open
rebellion, and it is reflected in our growing indifference to
tyranny and injustice abroad. And even those who declare
themselves to be in favour of freedom of opinion generally drop
their claim when it is their own adversaries who are being
prosecuted.
George Orwell, Freedom of the Park, TRIB. MAG. (Dec. 7, 1945),
http://orwell.ru/library/articles/park/english/e_fpark.
59 Ames, Hate Crimes and Thought Crimes: A Question of Mens Rea,
SUBMITTED TO A CANDID WORLD (Oct. 15, 2009),
https://acandidworld.wordpress.com/2009/10/15/hate-crimes-and-thought-
crimes-a-question-of-mens-rea/. Compare Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 479,
484 (1993) (finding a statute that enhances the penalty of an offense accompanied
by a hate crime constitutional, noting that “[a] physical assault is not by any
stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment”), with R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379–81 (1992)
(finding a criminal law that prohibited placing, on public or private property, a
burning cross, swastika, or other symbol likely to arouse “anger, alarm, or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender”
unconstitutional because it criminalized not the behavior itself, but improperly
focused on the motivation for criminal behavior; stated differently, the thinking
that results in criminal behavior).
PROTECTING HATRED PRESERVES FREEDOM 183
legislation amounted to thought crimes because “without the
thought, you’re not going to have the hate, and it can only be defined
by trying to look into the skull of the victim and in the head of the
perpetrator at the same time, let alone what might be in the head of
the judge.”60 For the most part, the arbitrariness of hate speech codes
restricts legitimate speech and assumes that people are not smart
enough to hear hateful ideas and reject them.
CONCLUSION
Free speech can no longer be considered “free”when expression
across the nation is being increasingly limited, restricted to so-called
free speech zones, or completely blocked.61 As the Framers
intended, the Natural Law tradition provides intrinsic grounds on
which to justify the freedom of speech and provides us with a
standard by which to assess the legitimacy of laws regulating free
speech. The freedom of speech preceded the existence of the United
States, and our Constitution recognizes that it is a right inherent in
human nature. Because government was instituted to protect rights,
it has an obligation to respect all persons’ individual speech liberty.
Because the value of free expression lies within “the information it
conveys, the thoughts it provokes, and the greater clarity about the
world it provides,” the value should not be measured by a
“bureaucratic balancing act” that weighs prominent cultural norms
against the subjective opinions of those in power.62
60 155 Cong. Rec. 64 (2009); see, e.g., Richard Cohen, Laws Won’t Rein in
Hate, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/03/AR2009080302222.html (asserting that “[t]he
real purpose of hate-crime laws is to reassure politically significant groups” and
emphasizing that the result is the punishment of “thought or speech”).
61 See John W. Whitehead, Have We Allowed the First Amendment to
Become an Exercise in Futility?, LEW ROCKWELL (Mar. 3, 2014),
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2014/03/john-w-whitehead/free-speech-rip/ (“If
citizens cannot stand out in the open on a public road and voice their disapproval
of their government, its representatives and its policies, without fearing
prosecution, then the First Amendment with all its robust protections for free
speech, assembly and the right to petition one’s government for a redress of
grievances is little more than window-dressing on a store window—pretty to look
at but serving little real purpose.”).
62 Haidt & Tatchell, supra note 41 (quoting Greg Lukianoff).
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Free speech is not the cause of the tensions that are growing
around us, but the only possible solution to them. The remedy for
hateful, abusive, offensive, revolutionary, disruptive speech is not
censorship, but rather more speech, even when the government does
not like the speech or has the power to punish it—a power it should
never have—because it should never be making judgments about
what speech it likes and hates. Ultimately, the First Amendment
demands that the test for acceptance or rejection of speech in the
marketplace of ideas be made by individuals—uninfluenced,
undeterred, and unmolested by the government.63
63 Napolitano, Free Speech and Political Conventions, supra note 15.
